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A5-03339/2000  
Part 1

## REPORT

on the establishment of a common European security and defence policy after  
Cologne and Helsinki (2000/2005(INI))

Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence  
Policy

Rapporteur: Catherine Lalumière

**CONTENTS**

	<u>Page</u>
PROCEDURAL PAGE .....	3
A. MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION.....	4

The following will be published separately in A5-03339/2000 Part 2:

EXPANATORY STATEMENT  
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION B5-0361/1999  
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION B5-0114/2000  
OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS

At the sitting of 21 January 2000 the President of Parliament announced that the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy had been authorised to draw up an own-initiative report pursuant to Rule 163 of the Rules of Procedure on a the establishment of a common European security and defence policy after Cologne and Helsinki.

At the sitting of 7 July 2000 the President of Parliament announced that she had also asked the Committee on Constitutional Affairs for its opinion.

At its meeting of 23 September 1999 the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy had appointed Catherine Lalumière rapporteur.

At its meetings of 25 January and 22 May 2000 the committee decided to include in its report the following motions for resolutions:

- B5-0361/1999 by Salvador Garriga Polledo on the creation of a European Civilian Peace Corps, referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy as the committee responsible on 14 December 1999;
- B5-0114/2000 Jorge Salvador Hernández Mollar on promoting relations with the Maghreb region in the interests of European security and defence, referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy as the committee responsible on 14 March 2000;

It considered the draft report at its meetings of 6 and 14 November 2000.

At the last meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution by 37 votes to 9, with 4 abstentions.

The following were present for the vote: Elmar Brok, chairman; Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne, first vice-chairman, William Francis Newton Dunn, second vice-chairman and Catherine Lalumière, third vice-chairman and rapporteur; Danielle Auroi (for Jan Joost Lagendijk), Alexandros Baltas, Bastiaan Belder, Andre Brie, Gunilla Carlsson, Carlos Carnero González (for Emilio Menéndez del Valle), María Carrilho (for Linda McAvan), Daniel Marc Cohn-Bendit, Rosa M. Díez González, Giovanni Claudio Fava (for Pasqualina Napolitano), Michael Gahler, Per Gahrton, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil (for Gerardo Galeote Quecedo), Willi Görlach (for Magdalene Hoff), Vasco Graça Moura (for Jas Gawronski), Bertel Haarder, Alain Lamassoure, Armin Laschet (for Alfred Gomolka), Hanja Maij-Weggen (for Hugues Martin), Cecilia Malmström (for Paavo Väyrynen), Jean-Charles Marchiani, Pedro Marset Campos, Philippe Morillon, Arie M. Oostlander, Reino Kalervo Paasilinna (for Raimon Obiols i Germà), José Pacheco Pereira, Jacques F. Poos, Lennart Sacrédeus (for Hans-Gert Poettering), Jannis Sakellariou, José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra, Jacques Santer, Jürgen Schröder, Elisabeth Schroedter, Mariotto Segni (for Luís Queiró), Ioannis Souladakis, Francesco Enrico Speroni, Ursula Stenzel, Hannes Swoboda, Maj Britt Theorin (for Mário Soares), Gary Titley, Johan Van Hecke, Geoffrey Van Orden, Demetrio Volcic (for Freddy Thielemans), Jan Marinus Wiersma, Matti Wuori and Christos Zacharakis.

The explanatory statement, motions for resolutions B5-0361/1999 and B5-0114/2000 and the opinion of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs will be published separately

(A5-0339/2000, Part 2).

The report was tabled on 21 November 2000.

The deadline for tabling amendments will be indicated in the draft agenda for the relevant part-session.

**A**  
**MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION**

**European Parliament Resolution on the development of the common European security and defence policy of the European Union after Cologne and Helsinki.**

*The European Parliament,*

- having regard to the resolutions tabled by:
  - (a) Salvador Garriga Polledo on the creation of a European Civilian Peace Corps (B5-0361/1999),
  - (b) Jorge Salvador Hernández Mollar on promoting relations with the Maghreb region in the interests of European security and defence (B5-0114/2000),
- having regard to the Treaty on European Union and in particular Article 17 thereof,
- having regard to the decisions on the European security and defence identity (ESDI) adopted at the 1996 Berlin North Atlantic Council and at the Atlantic Alliance Summits held in Madrid (1997) and Washington (1999),
- having regard to the declarations adopted at the European Councils at Cologne (3-4 June 1999), Helsinki (10-11 December 1999), Lisbon (23-24 March 2000) and Feira (19-20 June 2000) on the establishment of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) in its civilian and military dimensions,
- having regard to the meetings of the WEU Council of Ministers in Oporto (15 and 16 May 2000) and Marseille (13 November 2000) preparing for the transfer of some of the WEU's tasks to the European Union,
- having regard to the current Intergovernmental Conference and its discussions on enhanced cooperation,
- having regard to the Council Decisions of 10 May 1999 concerning
  - (a) the arrangements for enhanced cooperation between the European Union and the Western European Union (1999/404/CFSP)<sup>1</sup>
  - (b) the practical arrangements for the participation of all Member States in tasks pursuant to Article 17(2) of the Treaty on European Union for which the Union avails itself of the WEU (1999/321/CFSP)<sup>2</sup>
- having regard to the Council Decisions of 14 February 2000
  - (a) setting up the Interim Political and Security Committee (2000/143/CFSP)<sup>3</sup>
  - (b) setting up the Interim Military Body (2000/144/CFSP)<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> OJ L 153, 19.6.1999, p.1

<sup>2</sup> OJ L 123, 13.5.1999, p.14

<sup>3</sup> OJ L 49, 22.2.2000, p. 1

- (c) on the secondment of national experts in the military field to the General Secretariat of the Council during an interim period (2000/145/CFSP)<sup>5</sup>
- having regard to the Council Decision of 22 May 2000 setting up a Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management (2000/354/CFSP)<sup>6</sup>
  - having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council for a regulation creating the Rapid Reaction Facility (COM(2000)119 – C5-0272/2000 – 2000/0081(CNS))<sup>7</sup>,
  - having regard to its resolution of 15 May 1997 on the Commission Communication on the challenges facing the European defence-related industry, a contribution for action at European level (COM(96)0010 – C4-0093/96),<sup>8</sup>
  - having regard to its resolution of 28 January 1999 on the Commission Communication on implementing European Union strategy on defence-related industries (COM(97)0583 – C4-0223/98),<sup>9</sup>
  - having regard to its resolution of 15 June 2000 on the establishment of a common European Security and Defence policy with a view to the European Council in Feira<sup>10</sup>,
  - having regard to its resolution of 6 September 2000 on EU external action priorities<sup>11</sup>,
  - having regard to Rule 163 of its Rules of Procedure,
  - having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy and the opinion of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A5-0339/2000),
- A. whereas the European Union and its Member States have a platform of shared values and interests which they are duty bound to protect in a spirit of mutual solidarity,
- B. whereas, with the end of the Cold War, the distinction between security and defence has tended to become blurred and a security and defence policy implies the use of civilian as well as military means of diverting and managing crises threatening the interests and values of a State or group of States such as the European Union,
- C. stating again that, as regards defence in the conventional sense, i.e., territorial defence, the common European Security and Defence policy (CESDP) does not seek to compete with the Atlantic Alliance which today remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members, or to set up a standing European army;

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<sup>4</sup> OJ L 49, 22.2.2000, p. 2

<sup>5</sup> OJ L 49, 22.2.2000, p. 3

<sup>6</sup> OJ L 127, 27.5.2000, p.1

<sup>7</sup> OJ C 311E, 31.10.2000, p. 213

<sup>8</sup> OJ C 167, 2.6.1997, p. 99

<sup>9</sup> OJ C 128, 7.5.1999, p. 86

<sup>10</sup> see minutes of the sitting of 15 June 2000

<sup>11</sup> see minutes of the sitting of 6 September 2000

- D. noting nevertheless that Member States are linked by mutual political solidarity (Article 11(2) TEU) which in itself is already a factor for security and, when the time comes, will lead to a position in which the CFSP will also guarantee its Member States' borders as the external borders of the Union,
- E. whereas the CESDP does not affect the individual nature of the Member States' security and defence policy nor the obligations arising for some of them from their membership of NATO or the WEU,
- F. whereas the debate on European security and defence, which began in Pörschach, has gathered impetus with the NATO military intervention in Kosovo by making the people of the European Union aware of their inability to resolve large-scale crises,
- G. noting that this conflict highlighted the gaps and deficiencies in the European Union and its Member States firstly in crisis prevention by civilian means and then in their military crisis management resources and capabilities,
- H. welcoming therefore the European Union's prompt action which, in the form of the declarations by the Cologne, Helsinki, Lisbon and Feira European Councils, established the principles and modalities of a common European security and defence policy (CESDP) concentrating on preventing, managing and finding the way out of crises threatening international stability and security,
- I. pointing out that the efforts of the Union and its Member States to establish a credible common European security and defence policy are intended to strengthen the CFSP, enabling the Union to deploy the full gamut of financial, diplomatic, civilian and military instruments at its disposal to achieve its aims and to exercise a more effective influence on the outcome of international crises, given that recourse to military means is only a last resort solution,
- J. whereas the European Union's declared intention of taking its place via the CFSP and the CESDP as a major player in international politics will help revitalise and ensure fairer burden and responsibility sharing within the Atlantic Alliance, will lend substance to the concept of the European security and defence identity (ESDI) and will play an important part in preserving international security,
- K. welcoming the decisions already taken by a number of Member States to restructure their armed forces and acquire effective and in some cases common equipment, with a view to the establishment of the European Rapid Reaction Force as decided at the Cologne and Helsinki European Councils in respect of which the Capabilities Commitment Conference is the first practical step.
- L. insisting that Member States should devote the same effort to achieving the goals they have set themselves regarding civilian crisis management, in particular to establish a rapidly deployable European police force, and to bring into force comprehensive crisis prevention and management measures which are adequately financed and which are designed to support civil society in areas of tension;

- M. noting that there are still gaps which need to be stopped, in both institutional and equipment terms, if the Union is to have a credible conflict prevention capability and a crisis management capability by the year 2003;
- N. regretting that the CESDP is being set up without control by the European Parliament which is not involved in its formulation and insisting also on the need for parliamentary scrutiny and democratic accountability of CESDP involving national parliaments vis-à-vis the governments of the Member States,
- O. noting in particular that the national parliaments, which are responsible for adopting the defence budgets of the Member States, are not able to obtain a global and coherent view of the CESDP;
- P. stressing the importance of the principles of transparency and accountability in the field of security and defence policy;
- Q. recalling that an agreement between the European Parliament and the Council is required to authorise access to the documents specified in Council Decision 2000/527/EC of 14 August 2000<sup>12</sup>,
1. Believes that a common European security and defence policy is not an end in itself but an instrument to further the goals of the Union's foreign policy and may be used only to attain specific goals clearly defined by the Council in liaison with the Commission and with the support of the European Parliament;
  2. Reaffirms therefore that the CESDP will broaden the Union's options for conducting its foreign policy;
  3. Welcomes the latest Presidency report on strengthening the common European security and defence policy adopted at the Feira European Council and urges the European Union not to relax its efforts but to continue developing the civilian and military aspects of the CESDP, inter alia by taking the political and institutional decisions required to make it fully operational;
  4. Notes that the CSDP will be fully effective only when it is directed by a clearly designated authority, which is able to coordinate all available resources, both civilian and military; considers it is necessary to evaluate on a regular basis the new structures once they are put in place;
  5. Calls therefore on the forthcoming European Councils to take the decisions required to make CESDP fully operational in 2003 as decided at the Cologne European Council;
  6. Restates its belief that crises should be resolved initially by civilian means, but does not rule out the use of force when diplomatic means have been exhausted, provided

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<sup>12</sup> OJ L 212, 23.8.2000, p. 9.

that the use of force is in accordance with the founding principles of the European Union and the constitutions of its Member States and with the principles of the United Nations Charter and the OSCE;

7. Underlines the fact that, in accordance with international law, there should be an appropriate mandate from the UN Security Council authorising the use of military force; aware, however, of the possibility of a deadlock in the Security Council, stresses the need for reform of the UN Institutions; considers that, pending these reforms, and in the absence of a mandate as a result of a deadlock in the Security Council, the international community, of which the European Union is a part, should only be able to intervene militarily in urgent cases at the express request of the Secretary General of the United Nations;
8. Emphasises finally the need for the European Union to draw up the principles and legal bases for it to act either by civilian or military means or a combination of both on the territory of non-Community states in which a crisis is occurring;

## **I. DEVELOPING THE CIVILIAN INSTRUMENTS OF CONFLICT PREVENTION AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT**

9. Approves the guidelines contained in the report drawn up at Feira for strengthening the European Union's capabilities in the civilian aspects of conflict prevention as well as crisis management so as to:
  - (a) prevent the eruption or escalation of conflicts
  - (b) consolidate peace and internal stability in periods of transition and
  - (c) ensure complementarity between the civilian and military aspects of crisis management covering the full range of Petersberg tasks (humanitarian missions, including rescue tasks; peace-keeping missions, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making);
10. Supports the objective set by the Member States at Feira of supplying by voluntary cooperation a 5000-strong European police force for conflict prevention or crisis management, military units not being suitable for law and order operations; notes also that Member States have undertaken, within that global target, to meet emergencies by deploying an initial contingent of 1000 police officers within 30 days;
11. Welcomes also the Commission's proposal to set up a Rapid Reaction (financial) Facility to allow the Union to take emergency action and urges the Council to adopt the Regulation to that effect without delay;
12. Emphasises that this diversification and strengthening of the European Union's intervention capability in crisis areas must go hand in hand with action to restore and to consolidate the rule of law, democracy, civil society, an independent judicial system, local administration and the economy in those areas to allow a return to normal life at the earliest opportunity and to ensure democratic security in the area concerned;

13. Calls on the Commission and Council to give their attention to conflict prevention and developing a doctrine for intervention and an operational concept calling on the assets of the European Union of Member States and of other players such as the UN, the OSCE and other regional organisations, as well as the media and civil society;
14. Considers that the first stage in establishing a conflict prevention policy is to develop the European Union's intelligence-gathering and -analysis capacities so as to detect the earliest signs of any crisis;
15. Stresses that this policy will rely on:
  - (a) the loyal cooperation of all Member States who will have to make all their resources available to the Union,
  - (b) the strengthening of the PPEWU<sup>13</sup> which at present does not have the manpower or resources to perform its early warning task let alone its other tasks, and
  - (c) the strengthening of the appropriate departments in the Council and the Commission, which must pool their information and analyses;
16. Emphasises that preventive intervention should be tailored to the nature of the crisis in question and may involve the use of a range of measures from diplomatic pressure to positive action to strengthen civil society, without ruling out coercive action, ranging from political and economic sanctions to threats of the use of force;
17. Believes that there must be a clear distinction in non-military crisis management between purely civilian operations (humanitarian, observation, mediation, reconstruction etc., ) which could be carried out by a European civilian peace corps and police operations which could be the prelude to escalation in the use of coercion or take place at the post-conflict stage;
18. Considers it vital that the appropriate Council bodies (Committee for civilian aspect of crisis management), the Situation Centre and the Crisis cell(s) should cooperate closely with their counterparts at the Commission (in particular the Crisis Coordination Unit and ECHO) under a clearly designated authority so as to avoid the duplication of effort and ensure the effectiveness of Union action;
19. Repeats its request in its resolution of 15 June 2000<sup>14</sup> to set other headline goals than those relating to the police force, in respect for example of groups of specialists in the fields of the rule of law, the monitoring of elections, observation of situations, humanitarian aid and civil protection;
20. Calls on the Commission to list the civilian instruments now existing or yet to be set up, with a view to preventing and managing crises and emerging from them on the best terms;
21. Calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the Council, to produce a public annual report on EU conflict prevention, which lists the policies adopted, instruments used

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<sup>13</sup> Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit

<sup>14</sup> Not yet published in the Official Journal

and programmes supported; proposes that criteria be established for their evaluation as well as lessons learned from them;

## **II. DEVELOPING OF THE UNION'S MILITARY ASSETS AND CAPACITIES**

22. Notes that the Kosovo conflict revealed the European countries' weakness in crisis intervention not only in their civilian but also in their military capacities,
23. Restates its support for the headline goal set at Cologne and Helsinki of establishing a 50 – 60 000 strong Rapid Reaction Force by 2003 to be mobilised within 60 days and deployable for a year with the necessary air and maritime support and which should have its own command, intelligence and operational planning capabilities;
24. Welcomes the Member States stated willingness to attain this ambitious objective by reorganising their armed forces as appropriate;
25. Calls on the Member States in their procurement policies to draw on the lessons of the NATO intervention in Kosovo, the WEU audit, the NATO Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) and the conclusions of the Capabilities Commitment Conference;
26. Draws attention to the weaknesses or failures of the European countries in the fields of communications, command, control and information (C<sup>3</sup>I), strategic mobility (heavy airlift, in-flight refuelling), intelligence gathering, penetration of enemy air defences, all-weather, day and night attack capability, precision guided munitions and cruise missiles as revealed by the Kosovo conflict;
27. Proposes therefore that, following the Capabilities Commitment Conference, Member States should seek to remedy the deficiencies as they have just done in the strategic air transport field (Airbus A 400M), in the air-to-air missiles (Meteor), cruise missiles (Scalp/Storm Shadow) and reconnaissance and navigation satellites;
28. Considers however that the consolidation of the military equipment procurement process in Europe cannot be undertaken on the sole basis of individual or multilateral projects and that a substantial joint long-range planning effort is still needed;
29. Proposes therefore that the Member States assess their long-term needs, distinguishing between the short (2003/2005), medium (2010/2012) and long term (2020/2025) so that the necessary strategic, industrial and budgetary options may be taken up when appropriate;
30. Notes that the establishment of a European Union rapid reaction capability will raise the problem of the professionalisation of the Member States' armed forces, a process on which some have already embarked, and maintains that each State must take its own decisions on this matter, in the light of its political and social traditions and the role it wishes to play in crisis management;
31. Believes it essential for the EU Member States to increase their naval aviation

intervention capabilities based on the aircraft carriers possessed by four of them, in view of the importance of sea communications for the Union's trade and the scope they offer for performing Petersberg tasks, as the operations over former Yugoslavia have shown; calls on the Member States concerned, when replacing their aircraft carriers, to seek to achieve interoperability with a view to having available, in case of need, a homogeneous naval aviation intervention force;

32. Calls also for the countries of Europe to pool their carrier escort and support assets either in the form of task forces or as part of EUROMARFOR, which it proposes should be open to all the Member States, in order to give proper protection to the European aircraft carriers;
33. Supports the idea of developing adequate capacity for air and sea transport, in-flight refuelling, CSAR<sup>15</sup> operations, control of airspace (AEW&C<sup>16</sup>) and at a later stage battlefield control and for satellite, aircraft and drone intelligence gathering;
34. Notes that the forces at present answerable to the WEU (FAWEU) and the European Air Group will be among the forces available to the European Union and that they will be able to be called upon for the European Rapid Reaction Force; calls for these various forces, which in themselves are instruments for strengthened cooperation, to be open to Member States wishing to participate in them;
35. Calls on the European Union to take over the long-haul air transport agreement concluded on 30 June 1997 between the WEU and the Ukraine and considers that a similar agreement could be concluded with Russia in order to bolster the Member States transport and force projection capabilities;
36. Refers to its resolutions of 15 May 1997 and 28 January 1999 on European defence industry cooperation and notes with satisfaction the framework agreement signed at Farnborough on 27 July 2000 between six European countries which will facilitate the restructuring of the defence industries in Europe, as called for in those resolutions;
37. Calls for candidate countries to be allowed wherever possible to play a full part in European armaments cooperation;
38. Calls for the European Union to acquire a genuine space policy covering the civilian and military aspects of the use of space and for it to combine the national and multinational resources it holds in the military field in a Common European Union Space Command (CEUSC); considers however that the object of this new policy should not be to put weapons in orbit but rather to develop observation, listening and navigation systems;

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<sup>15</sup> Combat Search and Rescue

<sup>16</sup> Airborne Early Warning & Control Systems

39. (a) Points out that establishing an operational CESDP will require adherence to a common political vision and the identification of common interests, but emphasises at the same time that its effectiveness will rely on the acquisition by Member States of homogeneous intervention capabilities and the development of advanced technologies;
- (b) Calls, therefore, for the establishment of a common defence research policy;
- (c) Considers that the European research centres should take defence aspects into account in their programmes;
40. Points out that all efforts to improve the Union's military capacity and assets will remain inadequate if the Union does not adopt a strategy for the use of force, incorporated its common foreign policy, and if its Institutions have not undergone the necessary adaptation;

### **III. INSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS ARISING FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY**

41. Refers, as regards the decision-making structures of the CESDP, to its resolution of 15 June 2000 quoted above and hopes that COPS will be chaired by the High Representative for the CFSP, that a Council of Ministers of Defence will be set up and that the latter, should the need arise, will take part in the General Affairs Council;
42. Again expresses its concern over the effectiveness of the interim bodies set up on 1 March 2000 and over the coherence, in the present situation, between civilian and military operations the European Union might decide upon;
43. Points out that the setting up of the new bodies was not accompanied by any strengthened powers of coordination and initiative for the High Representative for the CFSP, by any clear demarcation of functions between him and the Commissioner responsible for external relations, or full coordination with all other parties involved, so as to establish a clear chain of command from the level at which political initiatives are taken and that of action on the ground;
44. Reiterates therefore the demand, expressed in its resolution on the IGC on 13 April 2000, that the positions of High Representative for the CFSP and Commissioner responsible for External Relations be merged in due course into a specially appointed Vice-President of the Commission;
45. Believes furthermore that the effectiveness of the CESDP will be closely linked to improving the operation of the CFSP and that for this purpose the Union must also have the capacity not only to gather but also to analyse intelligence; therefore considers it vital that the Torrejon Satellite Centre, at present under the WEU, should be transferred to the European Union, together with its Security Studies Institute, whose task should be amended to have it work in support of the PPEWU<sup>17</sup>; believes that the Member States, which have their own capacity in these fields, should cooperate more closely with Union bodies whenever the security of the Union as a

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<sup>17</sup> Policy planning and early warning unit.

whole is involved;

46. Hopes that the Nice European Council will set up the definitive CESDP bodies (COPS, Military Committee and Military Staff), will clearly define their respective responsibilities and decision-making powers, and give the impetus required for improvement in the operation of the CFSP in general and the CESDP in particular, to speed up and clarify the decision-making process;
47. Calls, in addition to establishment of these permanent CESDP bodies, for the Nice European Council to establish the principle, on the basis of the WEAG, the WEAO or the OCCAR, of a European Armaments Agency attached to the Military Committee, responsible for devising and managing common research programmes and planning investment and joint procurement spending,
48. Believes that the Council should consider the budgetary aspects of the CESDP in particular by providing for the cost of transferring the WEU functions required for the performance of Petersberg tasks also believes that the cost of Petersberg tasks should be apportioned between the Member States according to the GNP scale and calls for each Member State's contribution in civilian and military resources to the performance of those tasks to be taken into account in the apportionment process;
49. Calls at all events for any Member State not wishing to take part in a task to be required, by reason of the mutual solidarity linking the Member States, to make a financial contribution to be divided between the participating States.
50. Considers that Petersberg tasks should in the long term be funded from the general budget of the European Communities, which would require a revision of Article 28 of the TEU and of the Financial Perspective;
51. Asks that, in view of the inherent cost of establishing the CESDP, the Council and the Member States will not a priori rule out the possibility of increasing budgetary appropriations, given the need for such a measure to ensure the credibility of the Union;
52. Underlines that further development of the military tasks in no way should lead to a reduction by Member States of Community spending in non-military areas, in particular those areas which deal with civil crisis management, human rights and democracy, development assistance and humanitarian aid;
53. Notes that cooperation between the European Union and NATO is working well, as instanced by the first joint meeting of COPS and the North Atlantic Council held on 19 September 2000;
54. Supports the guiding principles and detailed procedures for the involvement of candidate countries and the European members of NATO but not of the EU in crisis management tasks undertaken by the European Union as agreed at the Feira European Council;

55. Recalls in this connection that:
- (a) in the case of operations decided upon by the Council of the European Union which require the use of NATO assets and capabilities, European States which are members of NATO but not of the EU may take part if they so wish and will then have the same rights and obligations as the Member States of the European Union, from the planning to the day-to-day conduct of those operations;
  - (b) in the case of operations decided upon by the Council of the European Union not making use of NATO assets and capabilities, European States which are members of NATO but not of the EU may be invited to take part in such operations with the same rights and obligations as Member States of the European Union, as stated above; notes that the same will apply to any candidate country and any other State such as Russia or the Ukraine which are invited to take part by the Council;
56. Welcomes, in that context, the additional capacity commitments several European member countries of NATO who are not members of the European Union have already undertaken to make available to the EU for its Petersberg tasks;
57. Points out that the Washington Declaration adopted on 23 April 1999 at the Atlantic Alliance summit established the principle that the European Union should have easy access to NATO collective assets and capabilities for operations in which NATO was not militarily engaged as an alliance, which in particular implies guaranteed access to NATO planning capabilities and a presumption of the availability of NATO assets and capabilities which would be identified in advance for use by the European Union;
58. Notes that any declaration which called into question the European Union's ability to call on NATO assets and capabilities in case of need could only encourage it to duplicate some of them, which would not be in the interests of any of the partners;
59. Notes that the Oporto meeting of the Council of Ministers of the WEU and that in Marseille paved the way for the transfer to the European Union of the WEU's functions required for performing Petersberg tasks, and this has implications for the structure of that organisation and its future, and that this raises the question of the future of its founding Treaty; notes the 'transition plan' adopted by the WEU military committee on 17 October 2000 which seeks, while the permanent structures of the European Union take shape, to ensure continuity in crisis management; notes that the WEU Military Staff with its Planning Cell and Situation Centre will disappear once its counterpart is set up in its final form within the EU;
60. Notes that two of the residual tasks of the WEU, mutual assistance (Article V) and arms cooperation via the WEAG could be the subject of strengthened cooperation if, after the IGC, they also covered security and defence;
61. Notes that the last residual task of the WEU, to provide a broader security forum, is beginning to be assumed by the Union, as the latter has decided to undertake regular contacts with the candidate countries and the European members of NATO which are not members of the EU;

62. Proposes therefore that the modified Brussels Treaty, which was concluded for a 50 year period, should be denounced under the procedure laid down in Article XII thereof, once the residual tasks of the WEU are performed by the European Union, which should lead to the dissolution of the WEU in 2004;
63. Calls on the Union Institutions, with a view to developing the civilian, politico-military and parliamentary aspects of the CESDP and to the run-down of the WEU, to recruit the latter's staff – those working both in its secretariat and for the Assembly, in order to benefit from their professional skills;

#### **IV. THE PARLIAMENTARY DIMENSION OF THE CESDP**

64. Refers to its resolution of 15 June 2000 mentioned above on the parliamentary dimension of the CESDP and strongly regrets the absence of this dimension from the Council's deliberations;
65. Refers in particular to its proposal that, within the framework of the CESDP and on the basis of experience with COSAC, a European parliamentary body for security and defence should be set up to correspond to the broader framework of European security;
66. Believes that this parliamentary dimension must, at all events, be developed within the European Union framework and, with its current powers, is able to assume the supervisory function carried out by the WEU Assembly;
67. Proposes that Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union, which requires the European Parliament to hold an annual debate on the CFSP, should be amended specifically to include the CESDP and that, in that context, the Council should report to it on the progress made in implementing this policy, including the efforts of the Member States to help achieve the target for 2003;
68. Believes in general that it would be valuable if the IGC amended the relevant provisions of the Treaty to take account of the existence of the CESDP alongside the CFSP, which would better demarcate the powers of the Union and those of its institutions;
69. Regrets the unilateral decision taken by the Council on 14 August 2000 establishing very restrictive access to documents, and insists that an agreement on this question should be reached between Parliament and the Council in order to enable the CESDP to function properly, and at the same time guaranteeing Parliament the possibility of exercising the rights conferred on it by the Treaty;
70. Welcomes the cooperation which has begun with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and provides a European and transatlantic forum for discussing security and defence matters;
71. Believes that it would be desirable, at the present stage, to adapt its own structures to

take account of the existence of the CESDP and better control its development;

72. Proposes therefore to set up a special administrative unit of its own to assist its Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy in its work concerning the CESDP and to facilitate the work of the Delegation for relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly which will have to become a permanent delegation;

## **V. TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS**

73. Emphasises that the European Union's efforts to establish the CESDP are compatible with the development of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO and aim to establish genuine partnership in all fields - political, economic and military - with the United States and Canada;
74. Is aware that the establishment of a balanced partnership between the European Union and the United States in security and defence and hence in foreign policy requires a reappraisal of each side's position in order to meet this new challenge which will alter the roles that each of the partners has held since 1945;
75. Regrets to note that the developments set in train at Cologne and Helsinki have not always been seen in their proper light in the United States and that an information effort is required to avoid any misunderstanding; proposes therefore that the Commission Delegation to Washington, in close coordination with the Presidency of the Union and the High Representative for the CFSP, should conduct an information effort directed towards US political leaders; also calls on its Delegation for relations with the United States Congress to raise the matter regularly with the members of the US Congress;
76. Considers that the European Union and the United States, as partners with shared values and interests, need to conduct a sustained dialogue on the great strategic questions such as the balance of power after the disarmament treaties and on the major international policy and security issues;

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77. Hopes that the specialist European institutes will be used to provide Members of Parliament and European officials assigned to the CESDP with the training they will need to carry out their duties;
78. Calls on the Commission and Council to examine the possibility of setting up a European Security College at Union level to provide a common European training for the civilian and military leaders in the institutions of the European Union and its Member States, which would thus foster a common culture in the security and defence fields;

79. Considers it vital for the European Union to adopt an information policy to explain to the public in the Member States and neighbouring non-Community countries the aims of the Common European Security and Defence Policy it is seeking to establish; believes that this task should be undertaken jointly by the European Parliament, the Council Presidency, the High Representative for the CFSP and the Commission;
80. Calls for a wide-ranging democratic debate to be organised on the issues of the European security and defence, and for the European parliament and national parliaments to participate; invites the Council and the Commission, within their respective spheres of competence, to jointly draw up a White Paper on European security to enable them to pool their thoughts on the short and medium term dangers threatening our continent, and to set out guidelines for political action on European Union civil and military interventions;
81. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, of the candidate countries and the European members of NATO which are not members of the EU and of the United States and Canada, the Council, Assembly and Secretary-General of the WEU and the Secretary-General of NATO, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

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## REPORT

on the establishment of a common European security and defence policy of the European Union after Cologne and Helsinki  
(2000/2005(INI))

Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy

Rapporteur: Catherine Lalumière

## CONTENTS

	<b>Page</b>
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT .....	3
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION B5-0361/1999 .....	22
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION B5-0114/2000 .....	23
OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS .....	24

## EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

### **I. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE REPORT**

1. Over the last two years the European Union has undergone substantial internal change. The introduction of the single currency on 1 January 1999, the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam and its new provisions concerning the CFSP on 1 May of the same year, the Kosovo war (25 March – 10 June 1999) and, finally, the fresh impetus given to its enlargement policy have completely changed the Union's self-image. In response to the new arrangements it has introduced, and under pressure of outside events, the Union has reassessed its role, gained the self-confidence and determination it had previously lacked and decided to embark what is, given its central importance for national sovereignty, the hardest part of the European integration process, i.e. security and defence policy.
2. With that in prospect, the drafting of a new report on the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP), following on from the earlier reports which Parliament drew up on this matter<sup>18</sup>, seems fully justified to allow Parliament to express its views on these new developments.

It will build on the resolution which Parliament adopted on 15 June 2000, in the run-up to the Feira European Council, on the establishment of the Common European Security and Defence Policy. Before examining in greater detail the various aspects of this new policy, it might be appropriate to consider its purpose, because many people in the European Union are wondering why the EU should be venturing into the uncharted waters of crisis management, instead of merely sitting back and enjoying its prosperity and continuing to administer the single market, which, in keeping with an approach based on free trade, should be expanded to take in an ever greater number of countries.

### **II. WHY THE CESDP?**

3. The prospect of a large-scale armed conflict in Europe vanished with the end of the Cold War. However, over the last 10 years Europe has seen a number of wars played out either on its soil, or in neighbouring regions: the wars in Yugoslavia, linked to the break-up of the Federation; the Gulf War, which saw the deployment of substantial military forces; the wars in the Caucasus, including the ongoing conflict in Chechnya, which have still not been resolved. There are, moreover, other crisis areas which have a direct or indirect bearing on European security: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has lasted for more than 50 years and which is currently flaring up again; the division of Cyprus, which dates back to 1974, a problem which might be resolved in

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<sup>18</sup> See the reports by Mr TINDEMANS on the formulation of perspectives for the common security policy of the European Union (A4-0162/97), adopted on 14 May 1997, and on the gradual establishment of a common defence policy for the European Union (A4-0071/98), adopted on 14 May 1998.

the context of the European Union; the conflict in south-east Anatolia, for which a political solution is still being sought.

Some of these conflicts have been or are regarded as a threat to European security, others as a challenge to its values. At all events, all these examples show that areas of tension are never too far removed from Europe, if they are not indeed to be found within Europe itself.

4. In Asia, future large-scale conflicts cannot be ruled out, since all the traditional factors for instability are present: overpopulation, poverty, economic disparities, territorial rivalries, cultural, ethnic, and religious divisions, availability of weapons of mass destruction. The recent conflict in East Timor, the incidents in the Moluccas and the attempt by the Tamils to secede from Sri Lanka are merely examples in miniature of the tensions affecting the region. Africa has likewise recently seen massacres, genocide and wars, whether in the Maghreb, the Great Lakes region or against the background of the recent conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
5. All this goes to show that a direct attack against a European country (or an EU Member State) is not the most likely scenario; however, every country, including the 'neutral' countries, maintains an army with a view to ensuring the security and defence of its own territory. This lack of an enemy certainly does not imply that Europe is invulnerable. In the new, post-Cold War geostrategic environment, there are a wide variety of threats to European security:
  - (a) unresolved territorial rivalries between two or more states may escalate into open conflicts. It would seem that in Europe territorial disputes have largely been settled, save for a few exceptions in the Caucasus. In this connection, the Pact for Stability in Europe, the prelude to the political enlargement of the Union, played a beneficial role. It has now given way to the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe established after the Kosovo conflict. In other regions of the world, however, this danger cannot be ruled out;
  - (b) ethnic rivalries, often exacerbated by religion as one factor determining national identity, may give rise to the appearance of separatist movements or even the break-up of states, if they do not result in the elimination of a minority group, a breach of the universal values of human rights. The history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century is full of examples of this type;
  - (c) economic threats, in particular if a country seeks to undermine the security of supply or lines of communication of another country or group of countries, (one example being Iraq's attempt to seize Kuwait's oil wells, which triggered the Gulf War);
  - (d) the lack of a culture of democracy or of experience of the market economy, which has left some transition countries facing internal turmoil, with the risk that they may drag their neighbours into the crisis or that they themselves may be the victims of attempts at destabilisation; this problem has come to the fore

in the European countries recently liberated from Communism, but it may occur elsewhere in the world. The corollaries are human rights violations, corruption, which poses a threat to democracy (loss of confidence in the political system) and to the economy (by creating an environment uncondusive to foreign investment), and organised crime, which exploits the state's lack of authority and loopholes in the law;

- (e) overly glaring economic disparities between two areas, with the migratory pressure and, if it proves too strong, the destabilisation which may result, not to mention the hostile public reactions in the country to which the economic migrants move;
  - (f) terrorism, which feeds off a variety of not always rational frustrations in the political, economic, cultural, religious and historical spheres and which seeks to achieve political ends by violent means;
  - (g) damage to the environment, which, in extreme cases, might give rise to population shifts and thus destabilise neighbouring regions;
  - (h) the proliferation of military technologies, which may lead to the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, but also trafficking in military equipment (e.g. small-calibre light arms);
  - (i) finally, the threat to a country's essential computer systems; the Gulf War and the Kosovo conflict have demonstrated the importance of the mastery of certain military technologies in the information sphere, the employment of which can serve to disrupt life in an enemy country. Our countries could equally well be the target of such attacks, the spread of certain computer viruses at world level being only a minor example.
6. In the face of all these current or future threats, the European Union cannot remain inactive and rely on others to guarantee its own security and defend its values, since its freedom and its soul would be at stake. The aim is not to transform the Union into a 'global policeman' intervening in every conflict and dispute, but it might be required to use all the instruments at its disposal should its security and interests come under threat, for example in connection with the possible spread of a conflict on its borders, should its security of supply and lines of communication be endangered, or should its values be flouted, for example in order to prevent the spread of destabilising, anti-democratic ideologies.

The wide variety of threats calls for a tailored range of responses. Until recently, the European Union as an entity had only economic weapons in its arsenal: development aid, economic aid, emergency aid. With the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, it added the weapon of diplomacy, in the form of the CFSP. With the adoption of the Treaty of

Amsterdam, it has strengthened its diplomatic options by giving itself the capability to intervene militarily in crisis management, on the basis of the Petersberg tasks<sup>1</sup>

7. The fact that the European Union now has a military capability must serve to make it even more aware of its responsibilities when it comes to intervening in a crisis. The Union will clearly not intervene in all crises, only in those which pose a threat to its security, interests and values. But when will it intervene? On this point, the wording of Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union is both vague and open to broad interpretation. To what geographical lengths will it go to safeguard shared values and its fundamental interests, maintain peace or strengthen international security? On what basis will the Union intervene? How will it reconcile its own objectives with the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a third country? Will it systematically seek to obtain a United Nations mandate or, in certain cases, will it intervene unilaterally? Will it sometimes be faced with if not a legal, then at least a moral obligation to intervene if the United Nations calls on it to act as its representative in a given conflict area? When will it use force?

All these questions demonstrate, if such demonstration were needed, that a specific EU doctrine on intervention could play a useful role in clarifying the conditions governing Union intervention in conflicts and crises, including deployment of its civilian experts or military forces on the territory of a third country.

8. This call for a doctrine on intervention does not point to an over-developed taste for 'doctrine' as such, as opposed to the 'pragmatic approach' required. It merely highlights the fact that the European Union may be faced with situations which call for urgent decision-making, and no major decision can be taken if no effort has first been made to draw up a clear hierarchy of objectives or to think through the various scenarios and assess their respective advantages and drawbacks. The hesitations surrounding the course of action to follow in the early stages of the conflicts in the Balkans show that the Union needs to clarify further its ideas regarding the substance it intends to give to Article 11 of the Treaty, above and beyond the texts already adopted concerning the Petersberg tasks and crisis management.
9. We also need to work on the basis of specific concepts. As far as the concept of **security** is concerned, it must be acknowledged that, in the context of the CESDP, it is a comprehensive one. A state cannot be said to enjoy security if it is threatened by an enemy, hence the need for a defence policy. It cannot be said to enjoy security if it is faced with a variety of internal conflicts or serious threats to its environment. The same applies if its neighbours feel threatened. All this goes to show that security is a global, indivisible concept and that the security of one country contributes to the security of others. By the same token, the security of a state may sometimes be said to be threatened at a substantial distance from its borders. What would happen if Europe's maritime communication routes were to be cut?

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<sup>1</sup> These embrace humanitarian tasks, including the rescue of foreign nationals, peacekeeping tasks and, finally, military crisis management, including peacemaking (Article 17(2) of the Treaty on European Union).

10. **Defence** is also a concept which requires some clarification here. Defence consists of a set of resources placed in the service of security. As a general rule, it can be equated with military resources, in other words, the army. This is what is meant when reference is made to the future 'common defence' of the Union, i.e. a European army, in contrast to the current situation in which the Union has only a 'defence policy' and is forced to use military resources which are still under the authority of the Member States. However, in connection with the European Union the concept of defence may give rise to confusion, since defence is generally taken to mean the protection of national territory against any form of aggression. However, at least at present territorial defence is clearly excluded from the scope of the CESDP<sup>1</sup>. So why is the new policy called 'common European security and defence policy'? It is essential to grasp the fact that, in that title, the word 'defence' is synonymous with 'military resources' and that these resources may be used either to protect the territory of a Member State, outside the scope of the CESDP, or in connection with interventions under the CESDP. The Member States each have only one army and the forces at their disposal at present could be used, in an emergency, to carry out the Petersberg tasks, even though those forces, a direct legacy of the Cold War, are not yet properly trained for such tasks. In the same way, forces set up to carry out the Petersberg tasks would have to play a territorial defence role should an EU Member State ever come under attack<sup>2</sup>. Accordingly, since no state is prepared to abandon the defence of its own territory, future military hardware will have to be multipurpose in order to deal with the full range of possible scenarios.

All this goes to show that the distinction between security and defence is not as straightforward as might be imagined. This picture emerges particularly clearly from the Modified Treaty of Brussels establishing the WEU and from NATO's new strategic concept adopted in Washington in April 1999.

11. The fact that reference is made sometimes to the CESDP (Common European Security and Defence Policy) and sometimes to the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) will give rise to puzzlement. In fact, the adjective '**common**' should now be dropped, since security and defence are covered by the second pillar, i.e. the intergovernmental sphere, rather than the Community pillar. However, the distinction is not as clear as it might appear. Firstly, many hope to see a gradual 'Communitisation' of security and defence. Secondly, already today measures carried out under the second pillar are often closely linked to those under the first pillar, with civilian and military forces complementing each other. Finally, the word 'common' is here being used as a synonym for 'joint', and not in its strongest sense.

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<sup>1</sup> Under the Treaty of Amsterdam, each Member State is free to organise its defence as it sees fit, either by relying on its own resources, or by acting within an alliance, NATO and/or the WEU.

<sup>2</sup> In fact, only the nuclear forces operated by France and the United Kingdom have as their sole task the defence of those countries' territory and vital interests.

### **III. EUROPEAN DEFENCE: A NEW IDEA WHICH HAS BEEN WITH US FOR A LONG TIME**

12. European defence is not a new idea: the basic texts date back to 1948 (Treaty of Brussels) modified in 1954 by the Paris Agreements establishing the WEU and, paradoxically, the Washington Treaty (1949) establishing the Atlantic Alliance. In 1952 the six founder members of the European Coal and Steel Community sought to establish a European Defence Community (EDC), but this came to grief in 1954 in the French National Assembly. After the failure of the Fouchet Plans (1960-62) the debate on European defence was put on the back burner for nearly 30 years. At most it was mentioned in passing in the report Mr Tindemans, then Prime Minister of Belgium, submitted to the 1975 European Council which stated that the European Union would remain incomplete as long as it did not have a common defence policy.<sup>19</sup>
13. The upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe which began in 1987, the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the subsequent process of German reunification, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the start of the war in Yugoslavia that year combined to give fresh impetus to the process of European unification. The Maastricht Treaty (February 1992), which represented the culmination of all these events, was a turning point in the affairs of Europe in that the Community became a Union. Alongside that of a single currency, the Union set itself the objective of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) including a common defence policy which might when appropriate lead to a common defence.
14. However, in the light of the crises occurring throughout the world (the Balkans, the Great Lakes, etc.) the European Union (now enlarged to 15 countries) became aware of its weaknesses and sought to improve the operation of the CFSP. To that end, two contributions were submitted to the Intergovernmental Conference with a view to endowing the European Union with a broader external intervention capability:
  - (a) the Finno-Swedish memorandum of 25 April 1996 on a strengthened crisis-management role for the European Union,
  - (b) the document submitted by six Member States (Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Italy and Luxembourg) on the integration of the WEU into the European Union, to which should be added the joint Franco-German defence and security concept adopted in Nuremberg on 9 December 1996, an interesting attempt by two Member States to harmonise their respective approaches in a sensitive field.
15. Many of the ideas set out in these documents were to be reflected in the Treaty of Amsterdam, which was signed on 2 October 1997 and came into force on 1 May 1999. This was true in particular of the Petersberg tasks and the objective of integrating the WEU into the European Union. To this should be added constructive abstention, an important factor for flexibility.

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<sup>19</sup> Quoted in Mr TINDEMANS' report of 30 April 1998 (A4-0171/98) on the gradual establishment of a common defence policy from the European Union, adopted by Parliament on 14 May 1998.

#### **IV. FROM PÖRTSCHACH TO COLOGNE VIA PRISTINA: THE AWAKENING OF EUROPEAN DEFENCE**

16. From autumn 1998 onwards, the debate on European defence resumed in earnest, in particular at the instigation of the UK Prime Minister. A succession of declarations were issued and meetings held, the most significant being those of Pörtschach (24 and 25 October 1998), Rome (16 November 1998), St. Malo (4 December 1998), Toulouse (28 and 29 May 1999) and London (19 and 20 July 1999). The real catalyst, however, was to be the Kosovo war (25 March – 10 June 1999).

The Kosovo war definitely made its mark on European public opinion. The brutality of ethnic cleansing in many eyes justified the use of force even without a formal mandate from the United Nations. While Europe undeniably for the first time played a vital role before and after the war in finding a political solution to the Kosovo problem, it is nevertheless true that US diplomacy, in conjunction with US military power, left no other choice than armed intervention. However, the experience of the war left a bitter taste in the mouths of the Europeans, who often had the impression that they were playing second fiddle in the military operations. For example,

- 80% of the missions were flown by the US air forces;
- the European countries whose contribution on the ground was greatest (Germany, Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the UK) made up the numbers in the allied coalition: for example, France carried out 20% of the air reconnaissance missions and 11% of the bombing missions.

17. The Kosovo war highlighted the Europeans' weaknesses or shortcomings in the areas of command and communications, intelligence gathering, precision-guided munitions, cruise missiles, heavy airlift capacity and in-flight refuelling. They had no electronic countermeasures aircraft, very few laser-guidance pods, etc.

The Atlantic Alliance itself also displayed weaknesses: technical weaknesses, with the degree of interoperability not always being adequate, as in the case of the AWACS, giving rise to communications problems; political weaknesses, with the US not supplying their allies with information on the missions carried out by their stealth aircraft (B-2 bombers and F-117 fighters), which increased the Europeans' feeling of marginalisation; weaknesses of approach, finally, with the Europeans, unlike the US, always prepared to undertake ground operations. Only in June, i.e. a few days prior to the capitulation of Milosevic, did NATO consider sending in ground troops if a stalemate was reached in the air campaign.

The war shocked the European countries into action. The first signs of this were the predominance of European troops within KFOR, which was set up at the end of the conflict, and the desire of the Europeans for its command to be entrusted to the Eurocorps general staff, which came to pass between April and October 2000, thereby dispelling the doubts expressed concerning the Europeans' ability to exercise a major command. These two examples show that the European Union no longer intended to be only a paymaster, but to play a political role to match its economic power. This

new determination found its first practical expression in the declaration adopted by the Cologne European Council.

## **V. THE TEXTS ESTABLISHING THE CESPД AND THE MAIN DECISIONS**

18. At the **Cologne European Council of 4 and 5 June 1999** the Fifteen, being '*resolved that the European Union shall play its full role on the international stage*', made plain their determination '*to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence*'. This policy is focused primarily on conflict prevention and crisis management in the context of the Petersberg tasks, with all the Member States participating fully and on an equal footing. Non-EU European allies and partners must be able to take part '*to the fullest possible extent*' under arrangements to be determined, without prejudice to EU decision-making autonomy.

Moreover, the Fifteen committed themselves '*to further develop more effective European military capabilities from the basis of existing national, bi-national and multinational capabilities and to strengthen [their] own capabilities for that purpose*'.

Finally, the Fifteen, stating their determination '*to launch a new step in the construction of the European Union*', instructed the General Affairs Council to '*prepare [...] the definition of the modalities for the inclusion of those functions of the WEU which will be necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks*', the aim being to take the necessary decisions by the end of the year 2000. In that event, '*the WEU as an organisation would have completed its purpose. The different status of Member States with regard to collective defence guarantees will not be affected. The Alliance remains the foundation of the collective defence of its Member States*'. They therefore instructed the Finnish Presidency to produce a progress report for the Helsinki European Council.

19. By adopting the two Presidency reports on developing the Union's military and non-military crisis management capability the **Helsinki European Council of 10 and 11 December 1999** gave practical impetus to the process launched in Cologne, without this implying the creation of a European army. The European Council decided that:
- (a) Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year military forces of up to 50 000-60 000 persons capable of carrying out the full range of Petersberg tasks;
  - (b) new political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council to enable the Union to provide the political guidance and strategic direction vital to such operations, whilst respecting the single institutional framework; these are the interim Political and Security Committee (iPSC), the Interim Military Body (prefiguring the future Military Committee) and the group of military experts seconded to the Council Secretariat who will form the nucleus of the future European Union Military Staff;

- (c) arrangements will be developed for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the needs of all EU Member States;
  - (d) appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow non-EU European NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management, without prejudice to the Union's decision-making autonomy;
  - (e) a non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to coordinate and make more effective use of the full range of civilian assets and resources, in parallel with those at the disposal of the Union and the Member States in the military sphere.
20. The **Lisbon European Council of 23 and 24 March 2000** considered the preliminary report drawn up by the Portuguese Presidency on 'Strengthening the CESDP' and welcomed the establishment, on 1 March 2000, of the interim bodies provided for in the Helsinki Declaration.
21. Finally, the **Feira European Council of 19 and 20 June 2000** continued the work on
- (a) the development of the Headline and collective capabilities goals, given that a capabilities commitment conference has been convened for 20 November 2000;
  - (b) the institutional aspects, so that the Nice European Council can take the decisions required to establish the standing CESDP bodies;
  - (c) the arrangements for the consultation of and participation by third countries (non-EU European NATO members, countries applying for EU membership, other third countries such as Russia and the Ukraine), the principle being that, once they have been invited by the EU to take part in an operation in which NATO and NATO assets are not involved, they will have the right to participate in decision-making, from the planning of the operation until its performance, on a day-to-day basis, on the ground;
  - (d) the principles governing consultation and cooperation with NATO: four EU/NATO working groups have been set up and have been holding meetings since July 2000 and an initial EU/NATO meeting at ambassador level was held on 19 September 2000. This cooperation between the EU and NATO has prompted the Council to adopt interim provisions<sup>20</sup> to guarantee the confidentiality of information, giving rise to a dispute between the Council and Parliament which could be settled before the Court of Justice. It must be clear, however, that there can be no security and defence policy without a minimum of confidentiality.
22. In conclusion, by means of a series of meetings held within the space of one year the main decisions have been taken and a start has been made on their implementation with a view to providing the European Union with a common security and defence policy. Everything points to the fact that the French Presidency will consolidate the

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<sup>20</sup> See Council Decision 2000/527/EC of 14 August 2000 (OJ L 212, 23.8.2000, p. 9).

progress made thus far, not least at the capabilities commitment conference in November and the Nice European Council in December.

## **VI. INSTRUMENTS OF THE CESDP**

23. It follows from this that today the CESDP can draw on resources of two kinds to deal with crisis situations: firstly it has **civilian resources** that can be used to prevent crises or bring them to an end and, secondly, **military resources** which may be used when civilian means have unfortunately failed.

These two types of resources are complementary and they will often have to be used simultaneously or successively, with civilian measures sometimes being followed up by military ones. It would therefore be desirable in future for a single authority to supervise both. At present civilian resources mainly fall within the preserve of the Community pillar and the Commission, whereas military resources still come under the intergovernmental pillar and the authority of the 'General Affairs' Council and the High Representative for the CFSP, who is placed in the Council. There has to be flawless coordination between all concerned to avoid contradictions or inconsistencies.

### **A. The civilian resources available to the CESDP**

24. This report deliberately focuses on the military aspects because they are a major innovation for the European Union. However, it is vital to recall here the broad lines of what has been done in the civilian sphere which has traditionally been a very important area of the Union's activities. It would indeed merit a specific report by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy in the future as, although much has been done to fine tune Union policy on civilian crisis management, there are still many points to be clarified and further progress to be made.
25. The European Council has already developed the civilian aspects of crisis management with a view to establishing a better balance among the various instruments available to the Union. It thus decided to set up, by 2003, a force of 5 000 police officers to carry out crisis management operations, 1 000 of whom must be deployable within 30 days. Moreover, the European Council laid down on a work programme for the forthcoming presidencies, embracing conflict prevention, the consolidation of peace and the internal stability of states, areas or regions in crisis or threatened by crisis, and, finally, complementarity between the civilian and military aspects of crisis management, with a view to covering the full range of Petersberg tasks.

These decisions were preceded by the establishment, on 22 May 2000, of a Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management<sup>21</sup> and a mechanism to provide coordination between the interim Situation Centre/Crisis Cell within the Council and the Commission. In accordance with its powers, the latter has submitted to the Council a

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<sup>21</sup> OJ L 127, 27.5.2000, p. 1.

proposal for a regulation<sup>22</sup> creating a Rapid Reaction Facility to deal with crises. This is a flexible financial mechanism which will be funded to the tune of EUR 30 million in the first year and EUR 40 million each year thereafter. The proposal is currently being considered by the Council and Parliament.

## **B. The military resources available to the CESDP**

26. During the Kosovo war many comparisons were drawn between Europe and the United States in the military sphere. For example, the total defence budgets of the Fifteen represent 60% of the US defence budget, but their military personnel numbers 1.9 million, as against 1.4 million across the Atlantic. In terms of effectiveness, the imbalance is even greater, the effectiveness of the countries of Europe as a whole is not even 60% of that of the United States. The reason is that in Europe many structures are redundant, equipment is not standard, the rate of modernisation is not the same, and there is little joint procurement, which results in the purchase of a wide variety of equipment, each country buying according to its budget and its own industrial circumstances. If the example of research budgets is taken, the disparity is greater still, which is a cause for concern in the future given that it takes between 10 and 20 years to develop a new weapons system.

This unsatisfactory situation was acknowledged in the Cologne Declaration in which the Fifteen undertook to make ‘*sustained efforts to strengthen the industrial and technological defence base*’ and to ‘*seek further progress in the harmonisation of military requirements and the planning and procurement of arms*’. The WEU audit of European defence capabilities<sup>23</sup>, the Defence Capabilities Initiative adopted by NATO on 25 April 1999 at the Washington Summit and the lessons drawn from the Kosovo war will be reflected in the decisions to be taken at the capabilities commitment conference on 20 November 2000. The Member States will endeavour to remedy their shortcomings and improve the interoperability of their military resources, whilst avoiding needless duplication with NATO assets. This presupposes that no NATO Member State has an *a priori* objection to an arrangement whereby the European Union can use NATO assets and capabilities if need be. This harmonisation of the armed forces of the Member States will inevitably entail difficult decisions, such as those on the reduction in the size of armies, professionalisation, specialisation, the restructuring of defence industries or the need to increase military spending.

27. The Europeans do already have considerable experience and resources which can be placed at the disposal of the CESDP. They can be summed up as follows:
- (a) First of all, the WEU has set up politico-military structures which the EU is in the process of taking over: the *Chiefs of Defence Staff (CHODs)*, the *Military Committee*, the *Planning Cell*, the *Situation Centre*, the *Torrejon Satellite Centre* and the *Institute for Security Studies*. These last two bodies should be transferred

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<sup>22</sup> COM(2000) 119 final (OJ C 311 E, 31.10.2000, p. 213).

<sup>23</sup> See WEU ministerial meeting in Luxembourg (22 and 23 November 1999).

to the European Union by 1 July 2001 at the latest, whereas the others, which have been recreated within the European Union, should disappear once the Union has set up the corresponding standing bodies. This is the thrust of the decisions taken by the WEU Council of Ministers at their meeting in Marseilles on 13 November 2000, which aim to scale down the WEU although it will retain three residual functions, in accordance with the guidelines established at the Oporto meeting on 16 May 2000 and the transition plan approved by the Chiefs of Defence Staff on 17 October 2000.

- (b) Then there are the FAWEU (Forces answerable to the WEU): the Eurocorps, which will form the nucleus of the future European Rapid Reaction Force, EUROFOR, EUROMARFOR, the Multinational Division (Central), the Anglo-Dutch Amphibious Force and the Hispano-Italian Amphibious Force. To these should be added the European Air Group. All these forces, composed solely of units from EU Member States, will appear in the catalogue of forces which will be drawn up on 20 November 2000 and they will be integrated, as required, into the future European Rapid Reaction Force.
- (c) The European States are developing their cooperation in the arms sphere<sup>24</sup>, prompted by the need to produce weapons which correspond to European needs and to maintain a scientific and technological base in Europe, safeguard vital industrial sectors and guarantee security of supply, in particular in the event of a crisis or conflict. Arms cooperation bodies already exist: the WEAG and the WEO under the umbrella of the WEU, OCCAR at multilateral level and various other specific bi- or multinational programmes designed to meet the needs expressed by the participating countries or by NATO. All these bodies should one day merge to form a European armaments agency under the authority of the EU Military Committee.
- (d) The recent decisions taken by several European countries to order a long-distance heavy transport aircraft (Airbus A400M), to build an air-to-air missile which can become a European standard (the Meteor), or to equip themselves with similar cruise missiles (SCALP/Storm Shadow) are all indications that a Europe of weapons is taking shape. The same can be said of the decision taken by six European countries<sup>25</sup> in Farnborough on 27 July 2000 to sign a framework agreement intended to facilitate the restructuring of European defence industries. Finally, mention could be made of the cooperation which Germany, Spain, France and Italy intend to develop in the sphere of satellite reconnaissance<sup>26</sup>, purchase by France and Italy of Horizon anti-aircraft frigates, Germany's proposal to create a European air transport command, the Franco-Dutch initiative in the sphere of maritime transport or the Belgo-Dutch initiative concerning F-16 fighters.

28. Finally, the Europeans can offset the shortcomings in their resources by using Atlantic Alliance assets and capabilities, for example in the form of CJTFs, pursuant to the

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<sup>24</sup> See the reports by Mr TITLEY, A4-0076/1997 and A4-0482/1998, adopted on 15 May 1997 and 28 January 1999 respectively.

<sup>25</sup> Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Sweden.

<sup>26</sup> Helios-2A and 2B, SAR-Lupe, SAR-2000, SPOT-5 and Pléiade satellites.

decisions taken at the Berlin and Washington NATO Summits acknowledging the existence of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO. In the air transport sphere, they can also use Ukrainian Ilyushin IL76MD aircraft when carrying out Petersberg tasks, pursuant to the agreement signed on 30 June 1997 between the WEU and Ukraine. Moreover, a similar agreement might be negotiated with Russia as another means of giving practical expression to the partnership and cooperation agreement with that country.

29. The European Union has no choice but to succeed in establishing the CESDP, because its political credibility is at stake. One can be confident, therefore, that it will establish its Rapid Reaction Force comprising 60 000 men (although a figure of 80 000 is already being mooted, so that the full range of Petersberg tasks, including the most exacting, can be covered), supported by 80 warships (including the aircraft carriers operated by Spain, France, Italy and the United Kingdom) and 300-350 warplanes, as the Member States pledged to do at the Capabilities Commitment Conference on 20 November 2000. It is estimated that the rapid reaction force will total about 200 000 soldiers. To this will be added the 5 000 police officers referred to above. There can be no question of this substantial force placed at the service of the CFSP failing in its objectives when it goes into action.

However, the ambitious objective which the European Union has set itself presupposes that the European Rapid Reaction Force should be able to act on the basis of clear political guidelines taken by an acknowledged political authority acting in real time.

## **VII. THE INSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS LINKED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CESDP**

30. The Cologne and Helsinki Declarations outlined the institutional framework for the CESDP: that policy will be developed under the authority of the General Affairs Council, assisted by the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee and the Military Staff. As the CFSP steering body, the General Affairs Council will take decisions on the crisis management operations which the European Union might carry out.

In that connection, the Secretary-General/High Representative for the CFSP will have a vital contribution to make to the effectiveness and coherence of the CFSP and to the development of the CESDP. The decision to appoint the current High Representative, Mr SOLANA, Secretary-General of the WEU as well can only help to maintain coherence between political and military decision-making. However, this degree of coherence is still not enough, in that the Commission remains responsible for a large proportion of the civilian crisis management resources. Pending a more comprehensive reform of the Treaties, which, for example, might concentrate in the hands of one Commission Vice-President the external relations portfolio and the duties carried out by the High Representative for the CFSP, the roles of the various players should be specified in such a way as to create a clear chain of command which establishes a link between the level at which political decisions are taken and the level at which those decisions are implemented, on the ground.

With that aim in view, the European Union must be able to work in real time. The PSC, which should be chaired by the High Representative for the CFSP, should therefore be in a position to take prompt decisions in keeping with the guidelines laid down for it by the General Affairs Council. This implies that the Union should have an intelligence gathering capability, in particular by means of satellites, and an analysis capability, a task for which the current UPPAR is not adequately equipped. The transfer from the WEU to the European Union of the Torrejon Satellite Centre and the Institute for Security Studies will represent a first step. The Union would also have to rely on fair-minded cooperation on the part of the Member States, which would be required to make their national resources available in cases where the security of the Union as a whole was at stake. This last point may well prove troublesome, given the ingrained nature of national habits.

The Union will be required to establish a Council of Defence Ministers to debate essentially military issues, such as arms cooperation or the creation of the European Union's own capabilities; thus far, only informal meetings of the defence ministers have been held. If necessary, the defence ministers should be able to take part in meetings of the General Affairs Council, particularly if the latter is about to take a decision on a Petersberg task.

31. At present, expenditure relating to Petersberg tasks is met by the participating states. Ultimately, the logical step would be to charge this expenditure to the general budget of the European Communities, which would require a revision of Article 28 of the Treaty on European Union. Pending that revision, the costs generated by such tasks should be divided up among the Member States in accordance with the GNP scale, on the understanding that each Member State's contribution in kind, in the form of civilian and/or military resources, will be taken into account. Finally, in the name of mutual political solidarity each Member State will be required to make a financial contribution to a fund which will then be divided up among the participating Member States, even if that state does not wish to take part in a given task.
32. A further point worthy of consideration concerns the future of the WEU. The Cologne European Council set itself the objective of bringing about, before the end of 2000, *'the inclusion of those functions of the WEU which will be necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks'*. This transfer is now being carried out by means of the creation of politico-military bodies in the European Union based on those established by the WEU, with the result that the latter will disappear as soon as the corresponding standing bodies begin their work. Moreover, a decision was taken at the two most recent meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers, held in Porto on 15 and 16 May 2000 and Marseilles on 13 November 2000, that the Torrejon Satellite Centre and the Institute for Security Studies will be transferred to the European Union in accordance with arrangements to be determined.
33. In 2001 the WEU will be scaled down, retaining only three residual functions: mutual assistance among the 10 signatory states to the Modified Treaty of Brussels (Article V), arms cooperation through the WEAG and the provision of an enlarged security

forum, represented by its Assembly to which the WEU Council is required to submit an annual activity report pursuant to Article IX of the Modified Brussels Treaty.

The first two functions must be seen in the context of the current debate on 'closer cooperation arrangements'. If those arrangements are approved by the IGC and cover the defence sphere, as proposed by the Benelux countries and Italy, both mutual assistance and arms cooperation could be the subject of closer cooperation within the EU framework<sup>27</sup>.

As far as the last function is concerned, the European Union is aware of the need to widen the framework of its own security and defence policy, since it already holds '15 + 15' or '15 + 6' meetings with the applicant countries and/or the non-EU European NATO member countries.

With regard to the WEU Assembly as a parliamentary forum for consultation and debate bringing together representatives of the parliaments of 28 participating countries, Parliament advocates establishing links with the Assembly through an interparliamentary consultative body on the lines of COSAC. This will not reduce the role of the national parliaments which must approve military spending and monitor the deployment of national contingents in crisis management operations.

Finally, as regards Article IX of the WEU Treaty and the report referred to in it, it has been asked what the content of such a report would be once the WEU is scaled down. It is now clear that discussion of security and defence policy will develop above all within the framework of the European Union and that the European Parliament will play a full role. Thus, the annual report on progress in implementing the CFSP submitted by the Council to Parliament pursuant to Article 21 of the EU Treaty and in accordance with Paragraph 40 (Section H) of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 6 May 1999 will in future have to contain a substantial section on development of the CESDP, which could include matters coming under the WEU's residual functions, such as arms cooperation, a vital factor in meeting the headline goal.

34. The Modified Treaty of Brussels will therefore have less and less *raison d'être* and should expire at the end of the 50-year period for which it was concluded, i.e. in 2004.

In order to take account of these upheavals, which will have a direct bearing on the staff employed by the WEU, Parliament is advocating that the individuals concerned should be recruited by the Union institutions - Council, Commission and Parliament - so that their professional skills can be exploited.

These developments also raise the issue of parliamentary scrutiny of the security and defence policy of the Union.

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<sup>27</sup> As regards arms cooperation, in the context of closer cooperation within the EU it will be necessary to draw up ad hoc arrangements with the non-EU countries which currently participate in the WEAG: Norway and Turkey.

## **VIII. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS**

35. In its resolution of 15 June 2000 Parliament expressed its determination to encourage and monitor very closely the development of the CESDP. That determination is based on two factors.
36. Firstly, the Treaty (Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union) gives Parliament the right to be consulted by the Council Presidency 'on the main aspects and the basic choices of the CFSP' and stipulates that the Presidency 'shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration'. In addition, Parliament may ask questions or make recommendations concerning the CFSP. Its powers are modest, therefore: it has no decision-making power and no budgetary responsibility in the military sphere, since military spending is still borne by the Member States.

However, Parliament can use this narrowly-defined legal basis in an effort to exert genuine influence. Moreover, it can apply substantial pressure through its budgetary responsibilities in connection with the funding of civilian measures under the first pillar.

37. A second factor reinforces this point. In the past, it was accepted that the grave and important issues of foreign and security policy were solely a matter for the executive, and that parliaments were spectators rather than actors in the decision-making process.

Today, in the Union, the situation is different. Firstly, some Member States, particularly the Scandinavian countries, have democratic traditions which already endow their parliaments with genuine powers in this sphere. Secondly, even in countries further south the need for transparency and democracy, the need to bring governments and the governed closer together, and the widely felt need to know and understand, make continued decision-making by a select few seem very imprudent. Parliaments, and not only the European Parliament, must play their role as representatives of the people to the full.

38. As far as the European Parliament is concerned, a number of problems will have to be solved. Thus,
- there is a need to reach appropriate agreement on the issue of the forwarding of secret or confidential documents. It is clear that not every document can be placed in the public domain and that the rules on the forwarding of documents must be based on sensible principles. A happy medium must be found between complete transparency and complete obscurity, one which satisfies everyone and enables Parliament to play its accepted role;
  - it is essential that Parliament should make administrative arrangements which enable it to monitor the development of the CESPD closely and continuously. A specialist unit set up within the secretariat of the Committee on Foreign Affairs might be a solution, at least initially. In the future, the reconstitution of a subcommittee responsible for monitoring security and defence issues should perhaps not be ruled out. However, one point must be clearly restated: these new bodies must be attached

- to the Committee on Foreign Affairs in order to maintain the coherence which is vitally needed between the CFSP and the CESPDP;
- finally, it is essential that those European states which are not members of the European Union (WEU associate members or partners, applicant countries), but which share an interest in its security and defence policy, should be offered a parliamentary forum. The same applies to the members of our national parliaments, since they already have a say in these issues, even if only through their role in approving military budgets.

Accordingly, consideration should be given to establishing an advisory interparliamentary body comprising, along with MEPs, national parliamentarians from the Member States of the European Union, non-EU countries which are associate members or partners of the WEU<sup>28</sup> and Malta and Cyprus, as mentioned earlier. This COSAC-style body would act as a link between the European Parliament and the national parliaments, whose delegations would include the respective chairmen of the committees on foreign affairs and defence.

Whether the matter at issue is Parliament's new role with regard to the CESPDP or the establishment of a new interparliamentary body or forum, in both cases the objective is the same: ensuring that the CESPDP is subject to democratic scrutiny worthy of the name.

## **IX. REALLOCATING RESPONSIBILITIES BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE US AND THE NEW WORLD BALANCE**

39. The establishment of the CESPDP has brought many questions and indeed expressions of concern from across the Atlantic. The US hopes that the establishment of this policy will be hedged by guarantees, and so the three 'Ds' called for by the US Secretary of State, Mrs Albright, were met by the three 'Is' of Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary-General and former UK Minister of Defence<sup>29</sup>, who was a member of the British cabinet when the Prime Minister formulated the proposals for relaunching European defence. The fears would now seem to have been allayed, particularly after the initial meetings between the European Union and NATO and the success which Eurocorps made of its KFOR command.
40. One point must be consistently borne in mind: the CESPDP does not pose a challenge to the Atlantic Alliance and NATO. It merely seeks to create a new balance within the Alliance by strengthening the European pillar, a much-needed step. Although the reallocation of responsibilities clearly concerns arms and hardware, it does not imply that Europe must systematically duplicate the US weapons arsenal nor does it imply that it should give up *a priori* certain highly sophisticated or advanced technology equipment. This new balance also presupposes scope for independent action and decision-making, even if only to enable the Union to take action in certain cases when NATO plans no such step itself.

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<sup>28</sup> The WEU includes 28 countries whose exact status varies.

<sup>29</sup> No duplication, discrimination or decoupling; improvements in European defence capabilities; inclusion of all non-EU NATO allies and indivisibility of the transatlantic link.

41. In the United States and Canada there is some confusion over the acronyms IESD/ESDI and PESD/ESDP, the first is used to denote the second and the word 'common' tends to be omitted. However, these are two quite different concepts. The first originated in the decisions taken by the Atlantic Alliance in Berlin (1996), Madrid (1997) and Washington (1999), aimed at giving the European members of NATO the possibility of using the resources and capabilities of the Atlantic Alliance for crisis management; the second is a political project that the European Union has been trying to achieve since the Cologne European Council (1999).

That said, it is misleading to suggest that the two concepts conflict and that the (C)ESDP undermines transatlantic solidarity. They are two different but complementary approaches with the same goal and are designed to enable Europe to take on responsibilities on the international stage. The (C)ESDP, with its political and military structures gives the ESDI substance by providing political guidelines for crisis management, guidelines that can be discussed between allies.

It should be added, to allay any fears that might remain, that the (C)ESDP is not exclusive: in achieving the headline goal, the Member States of the European Union are taking account of NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative; the future European rapid reaction force will be interoperable with NATO; finally, it will be open to units from non-member countries, which may or may not be members of the Atlantic Alliance.

42. The CESDP is therefore a significant factor for security, both for Europe and the US. Mr SOLANA, when he was NATO Secretary-General, pointed this out in a speech delivered on 23 September 1999 to the *National Defense University* in Washington, and the recent development of the CESDP has only confirmed what he said on that occasion. A strong Europe would make itself a viable strategic partner for the United States and Canada. Moreover, a better balanced transatlantic partnership was an argument in favour of the United States and Canada maintaining their commitments to the Atlantic Alliance, thereby contributing to international and European stability. However, such a partnership implies a balanced dialogue between the partners, particularly if there is a risk that arrangements guaranteeing stability at regional or world level, for example under disarmament or arms control agreements, may be called into question.

## **X. CONCLUSIONS**

43. In taking the decision to develop the common European security and defence policy, the European Union has set itself a challenge, a challenge it must meet, and this will require successes in the short term and a strong political will in the long term.
44. The European Union must first of all demonstrate its capacity to intervene successfully in the management of a crisis and, at the very least, set up its rapid reaction force within the time laid down. This will ensure that the CESDP, which some people are only too quick to call a vague aspiration on the part of the European Union, secures credibility in the eyes of European public opinion. Then it must analyse and clarify the objectives of the CESDP, which presupposes that it will

examine the type of crises in which it wishes to intervene, define the geographical scope of its interventions and specify the political conditions of its engagement, particularly in terms of the need for an international mandate. Finally it must determine the resources it intends to allocate to the policy, not least in budgetary terms.

In this context, the joint drafting by the Council and Commission, in accordance with their respective responsibilities, of a White Paper on European security and defence could play a very useful role in guiding policy and fostering a democratic debate within the Union, a debate in which both the European Parliament and the national parliaments should be involved.

45. Finally the CESDP will lead the Union to consider its own future and to find an answer that will ensure the credibility and effectiveness of its actions. Will it still be possible to maintain the intergovernmental approach, a formula that has been essential to launch this new policy, or will the Union have to opt for a federal approach, with a strengthening of the Commission, a development that may be inevitable in the future, particularly bearing in mind the foreseeable enlargement of the Union?
46. With the establishment of the CESDP, the European Union will acquire a new dimension which its senior political, administrative, military and other officials will have to take into consideration in their work. The development of a **shared security and defence culture** within the Union should therefore be encouraged in order to ensure that better account is taken of this new crisis management instrument. The specialist institutes in the Member States and subsequently the establishment of a European Security College, bringing together senior political, administrative, military and other figures from the Union and its Member States, could play a useful role in fostering a shared perception of the Union's political, economic, geopolitical and geostrategic interests so that conclusions can be drawn regarding practical action.
47. Furthermore, an information campaign directed at the Union's neighbours, who are concerned about the establishment of its military dimension, may help to show that the EU has no aggressive intentions towards them and that the CESDP is nothing more than an instrument for crisis management, the use of force being merely a last resort to halt atrocities, separate warring parties or maintain peace when civilian means have failed.
48. In conclusion, the CESDP is as yet in its infancy. The future will show whether we Europeans are genuinely capable of developing and operating this instrument, a vital adjunct to a proper foreign policy. It is an instrument which combines two closely linked and complementary aspects, civilian and military crisis management. It is all a matter of political will!

**B5-0361/1999**

**Motion for a resolution pursuant to Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure by Garriga Polledo on setting up a European Civilian Peace Corps**

*The European Parliament,*

- A. whereas there is a need to develop effective non-military crisis-management instruments,
- B. whereas peace in Europe is essentially dependent on the wholehearted commitment of the entire population of Europe, a commitment which makes no distinction between soldiers and civilians,
- C. whereas recent experience has shown that indecision and the inability to respond adequately when it was most needed lead to the inconceivable actually happening, and wars taking place in Europe at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century,
- D. whereas Europe's self-defence demands the large-scale involvement of its own citizens, if peace is to be guaranteed,
  - 1. Calls for a European Civilian Peace Corps to be set up as soon as possible;
  - 2. Asks the European Union to set up this Corps in order to guarantee that an effective non-military crisis-management instrument is available when needed;
  - 3. Demands that Europe's citizens play a leading role in order, to ensure that by means of the European Civilian Peace Corps, they can all take part in ensuring that the entire European land mass enjoys effective protection from the scourge of war.

**B5-0114/2000**

**Motion for a resolution pursuant to Rule 48 by Jorge Salvador Hernández Mollar on promoting relations with the Maghreb region in the interests of European security and defence**

*The European Parliament,*

- A. whereas the basic tenets of the security and defence policy are of particular importance in the structure of the European Union,
- B. whereas in striving to achieve a security and defence policy, provision should be made for special arrangements governing geo-strategic areas lying adjacent to Community territory,
- C. whereas the southern flank of the European Union is adjacent to the Maghreb region, with the Mediterranean Sea in between, and whereas there is a clear need for the Member States in this region to combine defence and security concerns with a policy of dialogue and cooperation,
- D. whereas the European Union should have special units containing experts on the Maghreb region, to help it remain abreast of what is taking place at the gateway to the European Union's southern flank,
  - 1. Calls for European security and defence policy to pay special attention to monitoring noteworthy events occurring in the Maghreb region which might affect the Community's southern flank;
  - 2. Calls for the current policy of dialogue and cooperation with the Maghreb countries to be consolidate and extended;
  - 3. Recommends that specialised units be set up to guarantee security in the area in question.

8 November 2000

## **OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS**

for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy

on the establishment of a common European security and defence policy after Cologne and Helsinki

Draftsman: The Earl of Stockton

### **PROCEDURE**

At its meeting of 12 July 2000 the Committee on Constitutional Affairs appointed The Earl of Stockton draftsman.

It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 11 October and 7 November 2000.

It adopted the following conclusions by 19 votes to 5.

The following were present for the vote Giorgio Napolitano chairman, Christopher J.P. Beazley vice-chairman, The Earl of Stockton draftsman, Georges Berthu, Jens-Peter Bonde, Carlos Carnero González, Richard Graham Corbett, Marielle de Sarnez (for Ciriaco De Mita), Giorgos Dimitrakopoulos, Andrew Nicholas Duff, Olivier Duhamel, Monica Frassoni, José María Gil-Robles Gil-Delgado, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Alain Lamassoure (for Hanja Maij-Weggen), Jo Leinen, Cecilia Malmström, Iñigo Méndez de Vigo, Gérard Onesta (for Johannes Voggenhuber), Jacques F. Poos (for Dimitrios Tsatsos), Konrad K. Schwaiger (for Ursula Schleicher), Mariotto Segni, António José Seguro, Margrietus J. van den Berg (for Enrique Barón Crespo).

## INTRODUCTION

At its meeting in Helsinki in December 1999, the European Council refined the rules for the deployment of a European Security and Defence capabilities “where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises”. The European Council invited the Portuguese Presidency to draw up a first progress report to the Lisbon European Council and an overall report to be presented to the Feira European Council containing appropriate recommendations and proposals, as well as an indication of whether or not Treaty amendment is judged necessary.

The General Affairs Council was invited to begin implementing these decisions by establishing as of March 2000 the agreed interim bodies and arrangements within the Council, in accordance with the current Treaty provisions.

The foreign affairs committee will draft its report in view of Nice (adoption is planned for the November session). In this view the constitutional affairs committee suggests that revision of the Treaties should be considered with regard to the decision-making and institutional structures of the ESDP and their democratic accountability.

### **Decision Making Processes and Institutional Structures**

- The Council has decided to establish the Interim Political and Security Committee and the Interim Military Body, and to reinforce the Council Secretariat with military experts seconded from Member States as of March 2000, in view of establishing the new permanent bodies: a Standing Political and Security Committee (PSC);
- the Military Committee (MC);
- the Military Staff (MS).

The Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR) in assisting the Council, has a key contribution to make to the efficiency and consistency of the CFSP and the development of the common security and defence policy. In conformity with the EU Treaty, the SG/HR will contribute to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions. Modalities for full consultation, co-operation and transparency between the EU and NATO will be developed. Initially, relations will be developed on an informal basis, through contacts between the SG/HR for CFSP and the Secretary General of NATO.

On the question of whether or not Treaty amendment is judged necessary, the Portuguese Presidency took note of the opinion of the Council Legal service the conclusion of which reads as follows:

"The Council's Legal Service is of the opinion that the conclusions of the Cologne and Helsinki European Councils regarding European security and defence policy can be implemented without it being legally necessary to amend the Treaty on the European Union. However, such amendments would be necessary if the intention is to transfer the

Council's decision-making powers to a body made up of officials, or to amend the Treaty's provisions regarding the WEU. Furthermore, it is for Member States to determine whether amendments to the Treaty would be politically desirable or operationally appropriate".

The Presidency suggested that the issue of Treaty revision should continue to be examined between the Feira and Nice European Councils.

## CONCLUSIONS

The Committee on Constitutional Affairs calls on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights and the Common Security and Defence Policy, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following principles and criteria in its proposal:

### *Institutions and Decision-Making*

1. Insists on the need for parliamentary scrutiny and democratic accountability of ESDP involving national parliaments vis-à-vis their ministers and the European Parliament vis-à-vis the Council as a whole;
2. Stresses the importance of transparency and accountability in the field of security and defence; regrets that the parliamentary dimension of the ESDP has not been mentioned in any of the declarations adopted at the European Council; considers that in connection with the existing institutional framework (and in particular the powers conferred on the European Parliament under Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union) should be clarified ; calls therefore for the parliamentary dimension of the CESDP to be developed in the context of the European Union and for the European Parliament to be fully involved at all stages in the development of this new policy on the basis of the responsibilities assigned to it by the Treaty on European Union with regard to the CFSP; proposes also that Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union, which requires the European Parliament to hold an annual debate on the CFSP, should be amended to include specific reference to the CESDP;
3. Stresses that enlargement will increase the diversity of the European Union and that this new reality must be taken into account in the operations of the CFSP;
4. Believes that in addition to any legal considerations, democratic considerations dictate that future development of the Common European Security and Defence Policy which goes beyond what is allowed under the current treaties (which is not the case for the developments currently under discussion) will require Treaty changes so that those transfers can be conducted openly, publicly and transparently;
5. Believes it essential that the ministers of Defence should be able to participate in the general affairs Council in the event of a crisis involving the use of military assets, in

order to improve decision-making and notes that this involvement has already been recognised by the Helsinki European Council;

6. Emphasises the need to maintain a clear distinction between civil conflict prevention and unarmed crisis management under the first Community pillar and military crisis management under CFSP/CESDP and the importance of ensuring that humanitarian agencies do not find themselves dragged into military or other armed activities;
7. Calls for urgent clarification of the status of the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in relation to the existing institutional triangle and, in particular in relation to the Commissioner responsible for External Relations. It is of the utmost importance that the lines of accountability between those responsible for the ESDP and the European Parliament and Council be clarified; recalls its position on the need, in due course, to integrate the High Representative into the Commission with a special status;
8. Transferring the institutional structures and operational capabilities of the WEU to the EU would require a number of provisions of the EU Treaty to be redrafted; If such a transfer was to take place, the mutual assistance clause contained in Article V of the WEU Treaty should be added as a protocol to the EU Treaty, to which each Member State would be free to adhere;
9. Notes that the national parliaments, which are responsible for adopting defence budgets, are not able to obtain a global and coherent view of the CESDP.